Global navigation jamming will only get worse. The U.S. needs to move fast

As geopolitical crises escalate, signal jamming and spoofing attacks on GPS and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are becoming more common, creating significant challenges and risks to aviation, shipping, and other critical services around the world.

Data from GPSJam.org confirms widespread GPS/GNSS jamming in parts of Europe and beyond as a result of the war in Ukraine. Affected regions include Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, in addition to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Turkey. The Middle East has also seen jamming due to hostile activities by Israel and Iran in the region. Other jamming activities, albeit on a smaller scale, are also common in Pakistan, India, and Myanmar.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide critical positioning, navigation, and timing services to users around the world. However, like other electronic-based systems (and despite industry efforts to strengthen the security of these technologies), devices that receive signals from GNSS satellites can be vulnerable to wifi jamming and spoofing. It is time for the United States to coordinate international efforts to stop the marketing and sale of devices that jam GNSS systems.

To be clear, gsm jamming and spoofing are already illegal. In the United States, the Communications Act of 1934, the U.S. Penal Code, and other federal laws and regulations prohibit tampering with navigation systems, including GPS, cellular and personal communications devices, and police radar systems. However, without international coordination to enforce existing laws and regulations, bad actors will continue to jam and spoof GNSS signals, disrupting critical uses ranging from personal navigation and agriculture to emergency response and defense.

New drone tactics keep jamming risk alive

A key feature of current conflicts is the new use of drone warfare, which is what makes GNSS jamming operations so powerful. As this technology becomes more widely available to state and non-state actors, these tactics are likely to be repeated again and again—regardless of where the conflict occurs.

While the Middle East is likely to remain a major hotspot for such activity in the coming years, it is not the only region at risk. Any country facing conflict or terrorism could face the asymmetric threat posed by cheap satellite navigation capabilities.

As a result, more countries will have to resort to defensive GNSS jamming to defend against these threats, resulting in a wider range of unreliable navigation signals that could affect airlines, shipping, and more. This gps jamming is not limited to affecting receivers on Earth. Low Earth orbit satellites carry GNSS receivers to improve weather forecasts, predict space weather, and monitor climate change. These important missions and other scientific research should not be hampered by regulatory inaction or lack of resources.