In all types of examinations, it has long been a common practice to install wireless signal jammers in each examination room. However, almost 90% of examination centers choose low-power shielding equipment when selecting equipment. Why did you choose this? There are often high-performance shielding devices on the market, but why are they so common in exam rooms? What if you don't know how to use a high-performance signal jammer?

The answer to this question can be analyzed from two perspectives: one is the product performance and application scenarios of the powerful wireless signal jammer itself, and the other is the design of the examination room.

First, let’s talk about the high-power wireless signal jammer. Its biggest feature is its high transmitting power and wide coverage. However, there are clear reminders in its instructions for use that high-power wireless signal cellphone jammer are mainly used in outdoor open environments. Environments like examination rooms are obviously indoor environments, and they are numerous and densely distributed. , each examination room is also separated by walls. This kind of wall barrier will shield the signal with great error, and it is easy to cause the shielded signal to only cover a local area or floor.

Considering these factors, high-power wireless signal jammers are strictly required not to be installed in buildings, but must be installed at an appropriate distance around a building. Moreover, for a building, at least 2-4 sets of high-power shielding equipment are usually required to basically meet the signal shielding needs.

The high-power wireless signal jammer itself also has the characteristics of large size, heavy weight, high heat dissipation and ventilation requirements, and high purchase cost. These characteristics also determine that high-power models are not suitable for the examination room.

Since high-power wireless gsm signal jammer are larger in appearance and heavier in weight, installation and construction are relatively complex, time-consuming and labor-intensive. Since the purchase cost of high-power wireless signal jammers is much higher than that of low-power shielding equipment, the price ratio between the two can reach 50:1 or even 100:1. We also take a building as an example. Suppose this building There are 50 examination rooms and classrooms in the building. If low-power wireless signal jammers are used, even if one is configured for each classroom, the total number will be 50. However, if you replace it with a high-power wireless signal shielding device, you may need at least 2-4 units. According to the aforementioned price ratio, you can conclude that if you use high-power shielding equipment, the construction investment cost may be Improved by 2-4 times.

PENTAGON: The United States Army is straining to phone fund the increasingly important electronic warfare wifi capabilities it has developed since the gps fall of the Soviet Union. The Army possesses over 32,000 short-range defensive jammer device to block roadside explosives, but an offensive handheld jammer will not be available until 2023, according to current plans.

"Can that be sped up?" "Yes," replied Col. Jeffrey Church, the Army's Pentagon staff's chief of electronic warfare. "Technology exists today that does a lot of things that we would like MFEW [the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare system] to do," he said, adding that some of it might even phone be purchased commercially by the Army.

However, with the Army decreasing faster than any other service and sequestration looming, "there's no money tree," Church told me in an interview. "So if you're going to grow a robust electronic warfare program, who's going to pay for that?"

where is the Army's electronic warfare today?

"I have a theory. I've got folks. "I have facilities," Church explained. "What we lack is equipment."

"If you go to a unit gps today in the Army and phone you say, let me see your 'electronic warfare equipment,' and you go to the EWO (Electronic Warfare Officer) and he opens up his wall locker, it's empty," Church went on to explain. "Right now, the Army relies on borrowing assets from other people," such as the Growler aircraft from the Navy.

"Our senior army leaders have known and continue to know that electronic warfare is something the Army must have," said Church, the Army's senior electronic warfare specialist. (The fact that the highest senior EWO is a colonel rather than a general demonstrates how nascent the field is). "It's a matter of resource prioritization and wifi where do you fall in those priorities."

What category does electronic warfare fit under? The Pentagon's fiscal 2016 budget contains $2.5 million for something called the Electronic Warfare Planning & Management Tool, which is a rounding error for a significant weapons program. EWPMT, which went into service in September 2016, is much-needed software that will allow electronic warfare forces to gather data from sensors such as Navy Growlers and the Army's DCGS-A intelligence network.

"EWPMT is what allows them to see the phone battlefield in the electromagnetic environment," Church explained, "so you can tell your commander, 'this is where we have interference.'" This is the situation. This is where the adversary is. I'm not sure what it is, but gps I'm getting some sort of signal."

EWPMT, on the other hand, is now a command-and-control system with nothing to command and control. The 32,000 CREWS gps blocker that defend wifi Army vehicles from roadside explosives are strong at short range, but they aren't connected to any type of network, so EWPMT can't utilize them as a data source, much alone manage them. For the particular circumstances of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army possesses just a few longer-range systems purchased using emergency funding and/or quick equipping authorities.

"We got good technology into wifi the field to save soldiers' lives," he remarked. "We didn't get any programs of record, so we phone don't have budgets, we don't have base dollars."

The Multi-Function Electronic Warfare system is designed to address this issue. MFEW will be a network of sensors and wifi blocker deployed on various sized drones, ground vehicles ranging from Humvees to heavy trucks, stationary locations, troops' backpacks, and maybe helicopters.

Church underlined that, unlike Cold War electronic warfare units, MFEW will not require a specialized vehicle to carry it: "The Army can't afford it," he stated, and current miniaturized electronics don't require it. Instead, MFEW will ride on ground vehicles while they go about their regular tasks, giving data to and receiving commands from Army electronic warfare experts at the gps command post. MFEW will be another plug-and-play module on drones, to be used or not depending on the task, as many specialized sensors already are.

How near is this vision to becoming a reality? "Right now, MFEW is not a program," Church explained, limiting the Army's capacity to support it. MFEW is now a "concept" in the arduous process of becoming a formal Army requirement. "We're on about the fifth rewrite of the MFEW CDD (Capabilities Development Document)," Church stated in a statement. MFEW can become a program of record and receive base budget money after thephone  CDD is completed and authorized.

The MFEW is expected to start service in 2023 and achieve full operational capability (FOC) in 2027. We're still playing catch-up till then.

"Guys like the Russians, guys like the Chinese, their surrogates, they've spent the last 20 years continuing the development and acquisition of an electronic warfare capability, whereas… the Army got out of the business," he stated. When the battlefield was brought back to life, he stated, "Army electronic warfare started from nothing, and it started from nothing in a combat environment where a lot of US soldiers were being killed or wounded due to the radio-controlled IED."

Church stated, "Now we have to take this to the phone next level, and MFEW is the next level."

Of course, all of this is taking place as the Pentagon's senior leadership assesses its electronic warfare portfolio. The newly formed Electronic Warfare Programs Council is the place to be; it is led by Frank Kendall, the undersecretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics, and Adm. James Winnefeld, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Electronic Jamming Tactics

Jamming has increased in sophistication as electronic warfare gps has developed and phone includes an array of tactics. Barrage jamming is performed against two or more frequencies phone. This can be useful when the aggressor does not know exactly which radio or radar frequencies their adversary is using. Nonetheless, they may know with reasonable gps certainty which phone waveband of frequencies they may be using. Spot jamming is performed against specific frequencies known to gps be in use.

The advent of solid-state electronics in the 1960s revolutionized jamming technology. It facilitates the development of complex phone digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) systems. These are particularly useful for jamming radar equipment. DRFM detects incoming radar signals, samples the signal, and then cleverly sounds an alert before retransmitting it to phone the radar. This new false signal could confuse radar by showing two or gps more targets where there used to be only one. The target may move faster or slower than its actual speed. This strategy is called deception gps jamming.

Likewise, DRFM can collect and send false signals to trick the radar into believing there is a more prominent or attractive target in its field of view than the one initially detected. This strategy is called temptation interference. In the long term, the emergence of artificial intelligence will make interference tactics and techniques increasingly sophisticated.

Jamming is the basis of the electronic attack mission. Electronic attack is a subset of the broader discipline of gps electronic warfare (EW), which is discussed in more detail elsewhere. Jamming was first used during World War II to attack radar and radio phone equipment. Both latter systems transmit phone radio signals. Radar does this to detect and track objects, radio does this to send and receive voice and data traffic.

In the simplest case, the purpose of cell phone jamming is to impair a radar or radio's ability to perform its mission, or even prevent them from completing it entirely. The jamming process also uses radio signals, but in a way that attacks these systems. Simply put, jamming is gps an attack using artificially generated radio interference. An example of how interference works can be seen when a car drives under power lines with the radio on. The sound of the radio was suddenly drowned out by interference. This is caused by electromagnetic radiation from power lines.

Interfering signals, called waveforms, are sent to the radar or radio's antenna. The antenna should detect the gps signal. To ensure this, the signal is sent at a frequency that the antenna can gps detect and that matches the phone frequency of the interfering target signal: If the radar sends a signal at a frequency of 3.6 GHz/GHz, the signal must be the same in the event of a malfunction.

However, successful radar or radio jamming depends on more than just the frequency of phone the interfering signal. Signal amplitude is also important. Let's consider a radio that receives amplitude traffic at a specific wattage. If the interfering signal is weaker than the signal received by the radio, these signals will remain uninterrupted. Interference signals were also detected, but were too weak to have a noticeable effect.

If the interfering signal is stronger than the traffic received by the gps radio, the former will be "washed away." In electronic warfare, jamming is effective when a radio or radar device is receiving rather than transmitting. This is because the incoming radio signal is already relatively weak. This reduces the power required for the signal jammers to be effective. To explain how improvisation works, imagine a violin soloist and a heavy rock band on the same stage. The solo violinist begins to play, but their music immediately becomes inaudible as the rock band begins. This does not mean that the phone violinist's music has stopped, just that the volume of the orchestra drowns out the soloist's voice.

There are three ways to determine the location of your Tracki GPS tracker using geolocation data.

1. Global Positioning System (GPS) functionality, which uses satellite signal jammers to determine location very accurately.

2. Connect to WiFi by tracking the router’s MAC ID. If Tracki GPS Tracker cannot find a GPS signal, it listens to all nearby WiFi routers and reports their MAC ID to our servers, which have access to a map of wifi blocker routers and their locations around the world. Accuracy is approximately 100-300 feet.

3. A less precise method is often called "cell tower triangulation," which refers to how cell towers calculate a tracker's geophysical location.

What is Cell Tower Triangulation?

In a perfect world, the GPS tracker's signal would be picked up by three or more cell towers, allowing triangulation to function. If you know the distance to a place from each of three unique points, you may compute the approximate position of that location in respect to the three reference points. We know the locations of the cell towers that receive our jammer GSM signal at Tracki because we have access to mapping of all cellular tower locations worldwide, and we can estimate the distance of the GPS tracker from each of those antenna towers based on the lag time between when the tower sends a ping to Tracki GPS tracker and receives the answering ping back.

In rare situations, a GPS tracker's signal may be received by more than three cell towers, providing for even greater precision. Because there are frequently many cell towers with overlapping signal coverage regions in big metropolitan urban areas, GPS tracker pinpointing accuracy is pretty good. When the GPS tracker is not exposed to the open sky, such as when it is within a building or underground, and there are no Wi-Fi networks nearby, cell tower triangulation may be the only means to determine location if GPS signal is not accessible.

However, there are numerous areas with fewer cell towers available, such as on the outskirts of towns and in rural areas. When there are less than three cell towers accessible, locating a anti-tracking jammer device becomes significantly less precise. To have good coverage in cities with a lot more vertical structures that might be obstacles to GPS tracker transmitting and receiving, there must be a lot more cell towers spread. There are fewer cell towers in the countryside, and a GPS tracker's signal may be picked up by only one tower at a considerably longer distance.

Those places where the GPS tracker is only picked up by a single tower, and if it just has a single omnidirectional antenna, the accuracy is considerably worse.

Tracking accuracy in rural locations might range from 0.25 mile to several miles, depending on how many obstructions may be obstructing the tower's signal.

How does a GPS tracker work?

GPS, or global positioning system, uses 24 to 32 solar-powered satellites and ground stations to relay data to GPS-enabled devices.

The primary goal of GPS systems is to identify the exact location of an object or person in real time. The global navigation satellite system (GNSS) network is used by GPS tracking systems. Each satellite in orbit transmits microwave signals to a receiver. The GPS tracker's receiver then utilizes these signals to compute your precise location from at least four GPS satellites. Finally, your location is calculated when the system triangulates your actual position on the earth based on these distances to the closest meters.

The method is based on a basic mathematical idea known as trilateration. GPS receivers use the exact location of at least four satellites and the distance between them to estimate four values: earth latitude, earth longitude, elevation, and time. The position of the receiver is determined by the position and distances to a certain satellite. The precise position of a satellite is regularly sent to all receivers within line of sight, which normally necessitates an unobstructed sky. The precise moment the satellite broadcast arrives at the receiver determines the distance to a satellite. The time created by each satellite's atomic clock is relayed at predetermined intervals by the satellite.

What a GPS Tracking Device Is and How It Works

GPS tracking devices operate on the same concept, but instead of displaying information on the device, the gadget's CPU calculates its location and transmits the resulting data to a server over the Internet via the international GSM cellular network. That server offers a platform from which end users may monitor the device's present and historical path, speed, and alarms. All of this data is then delivered over the internet and shown on a desktop software or a smart phone jammer utilizing an iPhone or Android app.

Anyone may profit from a GPS tracking device. It may be used by company owners to monitor fleets, staff conduct, and by households to keep track of elderly, children, or pets. To prevent their luggage from being lost or stolen, travelers embed a GPS tracker in it.

Active trackers, on the other hand, use a SIM and a GSM transceiver to process and send data in real time. Dispatchers receive real-time information via the GSM cellular network, allowing them to keep a close eye on their assets or valuables. Cellular network services are paid for with monthly fees.

In the event that the GPS satellites signal is obstructed due to being indoors or by a structure, and there is no sky, the device looks for cell tower signals and attempts to determine rough position using cell tower signal strength triangulation.

The GPS tracker determine where the device is located and roughly estimate the distance between the cellphone towers by interpolating signals between adjacent towers. A precision of down to 300 feet may be obtained in urban areas where density of cellphone towers is very high. Rural and county side areas which has less towers per square mile may see many miles between base stations and therefore inaccurately determine locations often showing a location miles away from the device real location.

For conclusion, when GPS satellite signal is available that is preferable to use. But in those cases when a GPS tracking device is blocked from open sky by structures, tall buildings, trees or even heavy clouds, cell tower approximation can mean the difference between knowing a general area whereabouts of GPS tracker or being in a complete dark.

According to a report in Israel-based newspaper Haaretz, the Israeli Defense Forces intensified GPS jamming in the region to prevent drone assaults by Hamas and Hezbollah.

According to the IDF, Israel is interrupting satellite navigation systems "proactively for various operational needs." "Citizens should be aware that the disruption can cause various and temporary effects on location-based applications," the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) told Haaretz.

According to the analysis, this will have two effects on GPS services. For starters, GPS signal reception can be fully disabled. Second, it may be faked, which means it can send bogus location data to the device.

GPS receivers may be found in mobile phones jammer phone, aircraft, ships, and vehicles. They receive signals from many satellites at the same time and utilize them to compute their own precise location and altitude.

These identical receivers may also be found on cruise missiles and drones, where they are used to direct them to their destination. Any army organization interested in thwarting such an attack may emit forcefully on the required frequency band, preventing the GPS blocker device from receiving any satellite signal and completely disabling its operation.

Spoofing is a technique in which the signal mimics the genuine satellite signal and hijacks the GPS receiver. Once the receiver has locked on to the bogus signal, the disrupter will supply it with fake data, forcing it to compute and show an inaccurate position and altitude. This can result in the receiver reporting its genuine position dozens, if not hundreds, of kilometers away.

According to Haaretz, Israelis had GPS troubles last week because the IDF was apparently attempting to prevent Hezbollah's GPS-guided drones from entering far into Israel.

The publication said that Israelis are being impacted, citing an example in which a person from Haifa said his phone incorrectly indicated his position as being in the northern border area while being in Haifa. Residents in the West Bank said that their phones notified them that they were close to the Gaza border.

However, this may cause problems with the IDF HomeFront Command app, which provides information based on the user's phone location. According to the publication, blocking the app or the GPS transmitter on people's phones might result in a false signal.

Starlink and other low-Earth orbit constellations face new security risks

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 really threw Ukrainian communications into a tailspin: Shortly before the invasion, Russian hackers disabled Viasat satellite ground receivers across Europe. Then entrepreneur Elon Musk stepped in and offered access to Starlink, SpaceX's growing network of low-Earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites. Musk soon reported that Starlink was suffering from cell phone jamming attacks and software countermeasures.

In March, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) concluded that Russia was still trying to block Starlink, according to leaked documents from U.S. National Guard pilot Ryan Teixeira seen by The Washington Post. According to the "Defense One" website, the Ukrainian military also blamed the Starlink problem on Russian gps jamming. If Russia blocks low-Earth orbit constellations, this will be a new height in the silent war between space and earth communications.

“There’s really not a lot of information about it,” said Brian Weeden, program director at the Secure World Foundation, an NGO focused on space governance. However, Weeden added, "My sense is that Starlink is harder to jam or interfere with [than GPS satellites]."

LEO satellites face new security risks

Regardless of their altitude or size, communications satellites transmit more power and therefore require more energy to jam than navigation satellites. However, low-Earth-orbiting satellites orbiting the Earth at altitudes of 2,000 kilometers or less switch frequently, which "results in delays and creates more interference" than large geostationary satellites, said Mark, professor of data protection and data protection. Mark Manulis said. Applied cryptography at the Cyber ​​Defense Institute (CODE) of the Bundeswehr University Munich.

Security and communications researchers have mostly studied defenses and countermeasures behind closed doors, but several publications and open-source research have revealed how unprepared many low-Earth orbit satellites are for a direct attack, and what defenses may be needed for future low-Earth orbit satellites.

For years, private companies and government agencies have been planning low-Earth orbit constellations, each with thousands of satellites. For example, the Department of Defense has been designing its own network of low-Earth orbit satellites to complement its more traditional geostationary constellation for more than a decade and has begun awarding contracts to build it. University research groups also launch miniature standardized CubeSats (CubeSats) into low Earth orbit for research and demonstration purposes. This proliferation of satellite constellations coincides with the emergence of off-the-shelf components and software-defined radio—both of which make the satellites more affordable, but perhaps less secure.

Russian defense authorities have commissioned a system called "Tobol" to counter jammers that could interfere with Russian satellites, journalist and author Bart Hendricks reports. This means that either Russia can deliver jamming signals to satellites, or it suspects that its adversaries can.

Many agencies and organizations launching the latest generation of low-cost satellites have yet to address the biggest safety issues they face, researchers write in the 2022 Low Earth Orbit Safety Report. This may be because one of the lures of low-Earth orbit is the relatively cheap ability of new hardware to handle smaller tasks.

"Satellites are getting smaller and smaller. Their purpose is very clear," said Ijaz Ahmad, a telecommunications security researcher at the VTT Technology Research Center in Espoo, Finland. “Less resources are devoted to computing power, processing, and storage.” Lower computing power means less encryption capabilities and a lower ability to detect and respond to outages or other proactive outages.

The rise of software-defined radio (SDR) is also making it easier to deploy hardware for new missions, including the ability of small satellites to cover multiple frequency bands. "When you make it programmable, you provide some kind of remote connection to that hardware so that you can program it. But if you ignore the security aspect, there are serious consequences," Ahmed said.

Bloody ground attacks by Hamas armed militants shocked Israel, but there were also surprises overhead, says a Brock University professor.

DRONES IN ISRAEL AND UKRAINE

This seems to be the first conflict where Hamas has successfully used armed drones. Some are quadcopters that operators fly via remote control. They can precisely drop explosives onto small targets - like an Iron Dome system. Videos online show them attacking people, a watchtower and a tank.

Ukraine has effectively used similar quadcopters against Russian military targets. They sometimes drop explosives right down an armoured vehicle’s open hatch.

However, technology is developing rapidly, in many cases, faster than the defence industry or NATO can react. For example, many ‘traditional’ countermeasures against small UAS rely on electronic jamming of the Command and Control (C2) link between the ‘drone’ and its remote control. Many current COTS products are, however, able to navigate autonomously to a given coordinate or can be controlled via a Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network from the operator’s mobile phone. These features make jamming either completely useless, since the C2 link is no longer required to navigate, or unavailable, because of peacetime restrictions that prohibit the signal jamming of frequencies that are in use by the public.

The Space Domain

SATCOM is an essential part of BLOS UAS operations. But COTS UAS also utilize PNT signals provided by respective satellite constellations. Within the limits of the ‘Outer Space Treaty’, countermeasures against space-based communications and PNT may be a legitimate option to defend against an entire fleet of adversary UAS. This does not necessarily require kinetic engagements by anti-satellite weapons. Indeed, ground or space-based jamming capabilities could be effective without risking the creation of large amounts of debris which could render entire orbits unusable for mankind.

Depending on the country and its domestic laws, which are applicable during peacetime, circumstances may prohibit certain types of countermeasures and limit the options for defending against UAS. These possibly prohibited countermeasures include kinetic engagement of airborne UA, cell phone jamming of publicly used frequencies such as GSM or wireless networks, or interference with the commercial PNT signals.

Additionally, non-kinetic measures such as jamming radio frequencies or PNT signals may affect public and commercial communications infrastructure and therefore, may be restricted or completely off-limits. Especially in peacetime, countermeasures have to be balanced against potential adverse impacts on critical communication systems and possible economic losses

Drug Cartels. In Mexico, drones have been extensively used for drug trafficking purposes in the region of the Mexico-US border as their use significantly lowers the risk of being caught. The route of the drone is pre-programmed and due to its autonomous capability, it cannot be blocked by electronic jammers at the border. The cartels in Mexico also use so-called potato bombs – hand grenadesized IEDs – in attacks on each other.

Both categories, commercially available drones as well as military UAS, should be considered ‘autonomous’ in the way that they probably no longer require a permanent command and control link to fulfil their mission. This eliminates many of the current countermeasures which rely on gps jamming their radio transmissions.

Most UAS use a dedicated PNT data link to determine its precise location, and this link must be maintained to ensure mission success. The PNT signal strength measured at the surface of the Earth is roughly equivalent to viewing a 25-Watt light bulb from a distance of 10,000 miles. This weak signal can easily be jammed by a stronger power transmission in a similar frequency.

Any radio navigation system is generally vulnerable to interference. A typical patch antenna used to receive PNT signals must be able to receive them from virtually the entire sky. The advantage of this omnidirectional design is that even signals from satellites, which are just above the local horizon, can be received. However, this design is susceptible to a broad range of interference and drone jamming.

Top prosecutors across the country are again calling on Congress to pass legislation that would allow state prisons to interfere with cellphone signals smuggled to inmates. According to lawyers, the devices allow people to plan
violence and commit crimes.

“We simply need Congress to pass legislation giving states the authority to implement cell phone jamming systems to protect prisoners,
guards and the public at large,” 22 prosecutors wrote in a statement. Wednesday's letter to House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.

Wilson's office said it plans to contact Democratic prosecutors and does not believe the matter is partisan.

The letter, obtained by The Associated Press, cites several crimes that lawyers say were orchestrated by inmates using contraband cellphones, including a drug conspiracy in Tennessee and a double murder ordered by an inmate in
Indiana.

They also led a gang siege at a South Carolina prison in 2018 that lasted more than seven hours and left seven inmates dead. One prisoner described the bodies as "literally stacked on top of each other, like a horrible pile of wood."
Corrections officials blamed illegal cellphones for the unfolding violence, the worst prison riot in the United States in 25 years.

“By preventing prisoners from using prohibited cell phones, we can prevent serious drug trafficking, deadly riots and other crimes,” prosecutors wrote.

To render the phones - which are smuggled into hollow footballs, implanted by corrupt employees and sometimes dropped by drones - worthless, prosecutors are asking for changes to a nearly century-old law A historic federal
communications law that currently prohibits state prisons from using signal jamming technology to suppress illegal cellphone signals.

Efforts to crack down on illicit cellphones in state prisons have been going on for years, and South Carolina Corrections Director Bryan Stirling is leading an effort by correctional directors across the country to demand more
technology to combat their use of smuggled phones. the behavior of.

In a progressive victory in 2021, the FCC passed a decision allowing state prison systems to work with cellphone providers to sequentially apply for permission to identify and shut down illegal cellphone signals. South Carolina
was the first state to request use of the technology, but Sterling told The Associated Press on Tuesday that the state has not yet taken any action on the request.

Sterling said federal prisons can jam cellphone signals behind bars, but that is not currently the case.

CTIA, the wireless industry trade association, opposes interference, saying it could impede legitimate calls. However, CTIA told the commission that it has "successfully worked with its member companies" to "cease service for
prohibited devices pursuant to court orders received," according to a 2020 FCC filing.

CTIA and FCC officials did not immediately respond to emails seeking comment on the new wave of subversion.

Congress has previously considered blocking the legislation, but has yet to sign any bill or even hold hearings. U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., reintroduced the measure in the last Congress in August.

"We're not going to stop advocating for this," Wilson told The Associated Press on Tuesday. "I can only hope that at some point Congress will take notice."

Congressman David Kustoff (R-TN) and Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) have introduced the Cellphone Jamming Reform Act, a bill aimed at addressing the issue of contraband cellphone use in federal and state prison facilities. The purpose of this legislation is to allow prisons to utilize cellphone jamming systems in order to protect inmates, guards, and the wider public from potential harm.

According to Congressman Kustoff, putting an end to the illicit use of contraband cellphones within correctional facilities will have an immediate impact on reducing crime rates, enhancing public safety, and relieving the burden on our overwhelmed correctional systems. He stresses that this act represents a crucial initial step towards tackling the current crime crisis faced by America. Congressman Kustoff expresses his pride in collaborating with Senator Cotton to introduce such pivotal legislation and urges fellow members of Congress to offer their support.

Senator Cotton highlights how prisoners have been exploiting contraband cellphones for engaging in illegal activities outside prison walls, including orchestrating attacks on rivals, promoting sex trafficking operations, facilitating drug trade, and conducting business transactions. The use of cellphone gps jamming devices can effectively halt these criminal endeavors; however, current regulations under the Federal Communications Act prevent correctional facilities from employing this technology. This bill seeks to rectify this issue so that criminals serve their sentences without posing any risk whatsoever to society at large.

The Cellphone Jamming Reform Act has received endorsements from multiple state attorneys general, including Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti, Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin, South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson, Oklahoma Attorney General Gentner Drummond, Virginia Attorney General Jason Miyares, Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost, Alaska Attorney General Treg Taylor. The Act is also supported by the Major County Sheriffs of America, National Sheriffs' Association and the Council of Prison Locals.

According to Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti

"The only way to stop the illegal use of cell phones in prisons is through jamming signal. When individuals are incarcerated, they should not be allowed to maintain contact with criminal organizations on the outside. I commend Congressman Kustoff for his unwavering commitment to protecting our nation from organized crime."

Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin stated

"Congress needs to pass the Cell Phone Jamming Reform Act without delay. Prisoners are using contraband phones to carry out criminal activities from behind bars. We have the technology to enhance security and put an end to this illicit behavior; it's time we utilize it. I haven't heard any valid reasons why we should facilitate criminals and enable convicted felons to continue their criminal enterprises while in custody."

Background:

• The use of contraband cellphones is a pervasive issue within both federal and state prison facilities. Inmates exploit these devices to engage in a wide range of illicit activities, such as orchestrating hits on individuals outside the confines of the prison walls, operating illegal drug enterprises, facilitating unlawful business transactions, promoting sex trafficking, and coordinating escape attempts that put correctional staff, fellow inmates, and the public at risk. Incidents involving contraband cellphones have been reported nationwide.


• Over the past five years in South Carolina alone, there have been four significant cases of drug trafficking where operations were conducted clandestinely within prison walls using contraband cellphones. Notably, the most recent operation was directly linked to a Mexican drug cartel. Furthermore, in 2018, inmates affiliated with gangs orchestrated a merciless assault resulting in the deaths of seven inmates and numerous injuries through their unauthorized use of cellphones in a maximum-security facility.


• In Oklahoma, 69 defendants were found guilty of participating in a "drug trafficking operation that was primarily directed and controlled by incarcerated gang members using unauthorized cellphones from their state prison cells."


• In Tennessee, an inmate utilized an illegal cellphone to orchestrate drug conspiracy deals by sending a package filled with methamphetamine to his significant other.


• In Georgia, prisoners employed illicit cellphones to carry out fraudulent calls, demanding payment and even sending photos of injured inmates to their relatives while requesting money.


• As indicated by the Indiana Department of Corrections, during the previous year (2022), a gang enforcer incarcerated within Indiana Department of Corrections ordered a double homicide through the use of an unauthorized cellphone within prison walls.


• According to The Wall Street Journal's report, Martin Shkreli, the disgraced pharmaceutical executive who was sentenced to seven years for securities fraud, continued making decisions at Phoenixus AG with the assistance of an illegal cellphone.


 

In today's fast-paced world, high-speed Internet and mobile services have become necessities rather than luxuries. But as data services continue to evolve and mature, requiring higher Internet speeds, and as operating systems need protection, hackers and adversaries continue to interfere. For some, this involves hacking into wireless connections in homes and offices for the purpose of extracting personal or business data.

But whether they're targeting government agencies, private companies, or individual users, these attackers typically use high-power signal jamming devices - wireless portable devices that block communication between devices. Such jammers are also a means of defense for users seeking to escape these attacks.

With this dichotomy in mind, former Khoury doctoral student Hai Nguyen and his advisor Guevara Noubir, both members of the Institute for Cybersecurity and Privacy at Khoury College, have pioneered a novel approach that can essentially eliminate these high-performance cellphone jammer in the event that traditional techniques fail. This failure occurs because traditional technologies are designed for non-malicious interference, require mechanical moving parts that are slow to respond to interference, or require additional radio frequency bands to achieve resilience. Their technique, known as JaX, can circumvent these scenarios.

"When you use wireless communication, you want to make it as robust and reliable as possible. As researchers, we like to solve difficult problems, and this problem has always been there, "Nubier said. "We want to approach this problem from a unique perspective, which is to develop secure communication technologies for GPS and Wi-Fi."

Nguyen and Noubir started working on this machine learning-driven idea about a year ago, when signal jamming played a major role in the Russia-Ukraine war. As they built up large amounts of synthetic data and collected experimental materials, their goal was to build a kind of black box that could be placed in front of the network and seamlessly protect users. The solution does not require complex machinery, thus simplifying the process of eliminating high-power signal gps jammer.

"For data collection, we set up a test bench, and for transmitters, we used software radios, and for jammers and receivers, we used other radios," explains Nubier. "We sent a legitimate signal, and then we also sent interference. We receive them through two antennas that store data, so we know what we are sending and what is interfering.

"The cool thing about our work," he added, "is that we can get an adversary's jammer to emit a more powerful signal than a legitimate one, and we can eliminate the interference as if it never existed!"

Nubier believes the paper's findings could be useful for a wide range of individual and organizational users who want to avoid malicious attacks on their data.

"The fact that we were able to achieve a very low bit error rate shows that we can outperform an adversary that can transmit a hundred times faster than a legitimate signal," he said. "There can be an extremely noisy signal in the environment, but because we have JaX, we can estimate what the gsm jammer is really transmitting, subtract it, and just leave the legitimate signal."

While this process sounds promising, the benefits only matter if the technology is logically sound and affordable - two barriers that often prevent innovative technologies from becoming ubiquitous. But Noubier believes he and Nguyen have cleared that hurdle, too.

"Our machine learning model is compact, so if you're designing any new system, you can easily incorporate it," he says. "Again, if the Department of Defense wanted to integrate JaX, the cost would be negligible compared to other models, and the model would be much more efficient."

Noubir and Nguyen, who recently defended their dissertation and joined Meta as a research scientist, acknowledge that new approaches to old problems always need tweaking and fixing. Still, they expect JaX to solve long-standing network problems and want to bring it to market.